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ARE A KNOWLEDGE OF AN OFFER
AND INTENT TO ACCEPT ESSENTIAL TO THE RECOVERY OF A
REWARD OFFERED?
Whether or not a knowledge of an offer
and an intent to accept the same are essential
to the recovery of a reward, are two, not especially novel, but rather important questions
involved in this segment of the law. They are
made important by reason of the fact that
there are upon each of the questions two distinct lines of decisions and uniform textbook and cyclopedic assertions that there is
such conflict, it being said that each side of
the proposition is "upheld by a strong line
of authority."
It is always desirable, if
possible, to have a uniform rule upon any
question of law, and therefore this article is
written with the hope that, in spite of holdings and assertions, it will not be considered
presumptious to attempt to show that there
is no substantial basis for the assertions, or
for one line of holdings. In order to have a
liability resting upon a person it is necessary
first to have a duty resting upon him. Liability is grounded in obligation, and this
must rest upon the party to be held liable
before another can have a right against him.
What, then, is the nature of the obligation
to pay a reward? If it is contractual we
must insist upon contractual principles controlling. If it has some other nature and
source, other principles must govern. Civil
obligations have their origin either in antecedent rights and duties in rem or in antecedent rights and duties in personam, tie latter
beibg contractual or quasi contractual. What
is the origin of the duty to pay a reward and
the corresponding right to obtain the pay ?
No one iould contend that there is a right,
the infringment of which would give rise to a
tort. There is no antecedent right in rem of
this nature known to the common law. There
would seem to be as little reason for the assumption that there is a quasi contractual obligation, although this is an assumption which
cannot be dismissed with a word. While in
both tort and quasi contract the obligation is
imposed by operation of law, yet in the two
cases there are some very marked differences.
A tort is a violation of an antecedent right
in rem where the obligation is generally
simply to forbear, while a quasi contractual

obligation is in personam and generally requires the performance of some act. A quasi
contractual obligation may be created by
judgment, by statute, or by the doctrine that
no one shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. The first
two are eliminated at once from this discussion by reason of the fact that they have
never created any such obligation as a duty
to pay a reward ; and it remains to determine
.whether or not such a duty may arise from
the doctrine of unjust enrichment. This
doctrine covers a variety of obligations, such
as that to return money paid under mistake,
or undue influence, or duress, or fraud, or
of an infant or insane person to pay for necessaries, or under certain circumstances of anyone to pay for benefits conferred without request. The last instance is the only one that
need occasion any difficulty, for, continuing
our process of elimination, we find that this
is the only quasi contractual obligation that
could possibly embrace the matter of obtaining rewards in the absence of the knowledge
of an offer, or an intent to accept the same.
Hence in the last analysis the question to be
answered is, how extensive is this doctrine ?
Is there a general obligation, independent of
contract, resting upon everyone to pay re
wards to those who render benefits without
request? If a person can recover a reward,
which has been offered, but of which he has
no knowledge, or which he does not at the
time intend to accept, we are forced to the
position that he can recover a reward when
none in fact has been offered. The obligation to pay must rest by law upon the party
for whom the service is supposed to be rendered, even though he has made no promise,
for a promise not known or relied upon is the
same as no promise at all. That there is any
such obligation cannot be admitted for a moment. It is true that such a proposition has
not been unannounced. In the case of Reeder
v. Anderson, 1 an action was brought by a
stranger to recover reasonable compensation
for the voluntary apprehension and restitution of a runaway slave, and the question was
whether the law would imply a promise by
the owner to pay the same. The court answered this question in the affirmative, using
the following anomalous language: "Though
duch friendly offices are frequently those only
14 Danal 193.
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of good neighborship, which should not be influenced by mercenary motives or expectations, nevertheless, it seems to us that there is
an implied request from the owner to all other
persons to endeavor to secure to him lost
property which he is anxious to retrieve;
and that therefore there should be an implied
undertaking to (at least) indemnify any person who shall, by the expenditure of time or
money, contribute to the reclamation of the
lost property." It is possible to understand
why a legal obligation should be imposed, independent of contract, upon infants and insane to pay for necessaries, upon anyone to
pay for his burial, or for the goods of another
received and kept, and perhaps, upon anyone
to pay fortepairs to, or expense of keeping,
lost property which has come into a stranger's
possession, providing the owner elects to recover the same. In all these cases if a liability was not imposed one of the parties would
be unjustly enriched at the expense of the
other. But the doctrine announced in the
above case goes farther than this. It does
not pretend to base the liability on contract,
or if there is a pretense there is nothing more,
for there is no contract express or implied in
fact, but rather seems to hold that there is a
legal obligation resting on men to reward
their neighbors for every friendly office they
may bestow. Where is this doctrine to end?
If there is this obligation to reward another
for the return to him of a runaway slave, is
there also an obligation to reward one who
finds and returns a horse that has been lost,
or a dog, or a watch, or a jack-knife? And
every time there is committed a murder, or a
burglary, or larceny, or arson, or a boy is
kidnaped, or any other crime against city
or state, is there an obligation to reward anyone who happens to discover the criminal or
culprit ? Would the doctrine end here ?
Would not everyone be required to reward a
friend or enemy for voluntarily painting his
house, or fencing his yard, or sending roses
or ice cream to his sick-bed, or rendering any
other act of kindness? Would there be any
case of benefit conferred that coud escape
its blighting touch ? Admit such a doctrine
and the law of gifts and executery contracts
would be obliterated and we should go back
at once to status, and a status intolerable,
whereas the tendency of the law has always
been from status to contract. In matters of
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this kind it is better to leave the question of
obligation for the decision of the individual
parties and let it rest upon the certain foundation of contract. The case of Reeder v.
Anderson, supra, must consequently be held
to promulgate a dangerous doctrine, and one
not sustained by the best reasoning, or wellconsidered decisions. Liability, if in a given
case liability exists, must be founded upon
some contract, except in the one or two cases
where a legal obligation is imposed independent thereof, because of the palpable unjust
enrichment which would otherwise result, or
where the interests of the public demand it. 2
Placing the right to recover a reward upon
contractual grounds, before a liability can
arise all the elements of a valid contract must
be found. One party cannot make a contract,
as, if it were admitted to be a contract, would
be true in the case of Reeder v. Anderson. 8
No one can by such officious intermeddling
cast a liability on another. The law will not
thus allow a man to make himself a creditor
by his own unsolicited act. There must also
be an assent, or an agreement understood
and assented to by both of the parties. This
means that there must be an offer on one side,
which is absolutely and unconditionally accepted in all particulars on the other side,
with the intent on the part of the parties to enter into legal relations and with terms that are
definite and certain. There can be no acceptance of an offer of which the acceptor has never
heard nor an acceptance which is not meant
to be such by the person making it. If he does
not know of the offer, the giving of information or doing any other act cannot constitute
even an acceptance, much less both an offer
and acceptance, and if he knows of the offer
but does not intend to accept it his acts may
amount to a gift but they do not supply the
element of assent necessary to every valid
contract, nor give rise to any obligation upon
which suit may be brought. In the third
place the agreement must be lifted up to
where it will be recognized by the law courts
and thus become legal, or enforcible, or obligatory, by having in addition to the other ele2 Isle

Royal Mining Company v. Hertin, 37 Mich.

332; Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 John. 28; Chase v.
Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286; Boulton v. Jones, 2 H. & N

564; Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N. Y. 574; Cook v.
Daggett, 2 Allen, 439; Allen v. Bryson, 67 Iowa, 591;
Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 Ad. & E. 438.

Supra.
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merits a consideration or other prerequisites
prescribed by law. In order that a contractual
relation may exist between the claimant and
the offerer of a reward, the offer, on the one
hand, must not only be accepted, on the
other hand, by the performance of the service
in such a way as to constitute consent to the
offer, but the services of the claimant must
be r~ndered in consequence of the reward
offered, in consideration thereof and with a
view to earning the same. If anyone desires
to place this liability upon the ground of a
contract'implied in fact, I am not going to
quarrel with him. There are some reasons
why it might be desirable to say that the assent is implied from the conduct of the parties, when the offerer makes a promise which
he expects will induce men to do some work for
him, and in reliance upon his offer and with a
view to obtaining the reward the claimant
renders the services specified in the offer.
But whether the contract be regarded as express or implied, it must be one or the other;
liability can arise in no other way. Of course
one is liable in quasi contract for benefits
conferred upon request, as where for instance
a contract is not enforcible, and while this
would not include cases of rewards unknown
or unacted upon, yet the doctrine might assimilate the case of an offer of reward known
and acted upon with intent to accept were it
not for the fact that the transaction is equivalent to an actual contract,. because there is an
aggregatiomentium on the part of the parties.
But the proposition under discussion does
not come under this hypothesis. So that, in
conclusion, I should say that to entitle a person to a reward offered for the recovery, or
for information leading to the recovery, of
property lost, or for the apprehension of a
felon, or for anythina else, however the offer
may be framed, that person must show a
rendering of the services required (1) after a
knowledge of, and (2) .with a view of obtaining, the reward offered. This proposition is
maintained and sustained by numerous and
well-considered cases. 4
In the case of Williams v. West
4Williams v. West Chicago St. R. R. Co., 191 Il'
610; Chicago v. Sebring, 16 Il1. App. 181; lowland
v. Lounds, 51 N. Y. 604; Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N. Y.
248; Stamper v. Temple, 8 Humph. 113; Fink v.
Meyers, 4 Kulp. 145; Rea v. Smith, 2Handy, 193; Wilson v. Stump, 103 Cal. 255; Hewitt v. Anderson, 56

Cal. 476; Marvin v. Treat, 37 Conn. 96.

Chicago, 5 an action of assumpsit was
brought to recover a reward of $5000
offered for the arrest and conviction of
the murderer or murderers of one C. B.
Birch, killed while in the service of the defendant street railway company. The claimant read this offer in the Chicago Tribune,
but before reading it had already performed
most of the services rendered by him and
contemplated by the offer. Parties known
as Mannow and Windrath were convicted of
the crime, and the only services rendered by
the defendant in connection with their arrest
and conviction, after he knew of the offered
reward, consisted in his identification of
Windrath and his testimony on the trial that
he had seen Mannow and Windrath together
near the time of the commission of the crime.
Holding that the claimant failed to make out
a cause of action the court said: "The right
to recover a reward arises out of the contractual relation which exists between the
person offering the reward and the claimant,
which is implied by law by reason of the offer
on the one hand and the performance of the
service on the other, the reason of the rule
being that the services of the claimant are
rendered in consequence of the offered reward, from which an implied promise is
raised on the part of the person offering the
reward to pay him the amount thereof by
reason of the performance by him of such
service, and no such promise can be implied
unless he knew at the time of the performance
of the service that the reward had been offered,
and in consideration thereof, and with a view
to earning the same, rendered the service
specified in such offer."
In Fitch v. Snedaker, 6 the court held that
testimony ag to information given by the
claimant before he heard of the reward should
be excluded, and said: "The form of action
in all such cases is assumpsit. The defendant is proceeded against as upon his contract
to pay, and the first question is, was there a
contract between the parties? To the existence of a contract there must be mutual assent, or, in another form, offer and consent
to the offer. . . . Without that there is
no contract. How, then, can there be consent or assent to that of which the party has
never heard? . . . The offer could only
5 Supra.
6

Supra.
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operate upon plaintiffs after they heard of it."
In the case of Stamper v. Temple, 7 where
the lower court had charged the jury that
the fact that the claimants were at the time
ignorant that the reward had been offered
would be no ground of defense against a suit
brought for its recovery," the Supreme
Court of Tennessee used the following language: "To make a good contract there
must be an aggregatio mentium, an agreement on the one part to give, and on the
other to receive. How could there be such
an agreement if the plaintiffs in this case
made the arrest in ignorance that a reward
had been offered? The arrest would have
been made not for the reward but in the discharge of the public duty."
In the case of Howland v. Lounds, 8 where
a reward of $150 was offered for the recovery, or information leading to the recovery
of a stray mare, and there were a number of
claimants for the reward the court decided
that it belonged to the plaintiff, Howland,
for the following reason: "In order to entitle a party to a reward offered, he must establish between himself and the person offering the reward not only the offer and his acceptance of it, but his performance of the
services for which the reward was offered;
and upon principle, as well as upon authority, the performance of this service by one
who did not know of the offer, and could not
have acted in reference to it, cannot recover."
But there are some decisions, not in line
with these holdings, which permit a recovery
in such cases, in the absence of a knowledge
of the offer, or an intent to accept it, although upon what ground, it would take
more than an Oedipus Tyranus to guess.
In the early English case of Williams v.
Carwardine,I a reward had been offered by
the defendant for information which was supplied by the plaintiff, but not with a view to
the reward. The report of the case does not
show that the plaintiff was unaware of the
offer, the only point which seems to have
been raised being that the reward was not
the motive which induced the plaintiff to
supply the information. The court held that
the motive was immaterial, and that "there
was a contract with the person who performed

No.

6

he condition mentioned in the advertisement." We have already explained why we
think that giving information under such circumstances cannot amount to a valid acceptance, for the element of assent is lacking,
and what is the magic power of the word
A condition is neither a con"condition?"
tract, nor a creator of one. In order to have
any validity it must be a term in a contract,
but before that can occur there must be a
valid contract, and if for the lack of the element of assent, or consideration, or proper
parties, or subject-matter, the attempted contract falls to the ground the condition, incident and annexed thereto, falls with it. It
is absurd to talk about a condition standing
alone wiihout a contract. Suppose it were
pnssible to conceive of a condition precedent
not in a contract to be fulfilled how is any
obligation to arise?
One of the first cases on this proposition
to be decided in this country was that of
Eagle v. Smith, 1 0 where there was an offer
of reward for the recovery of a horse, wagon,
etc., stolen, which were returned before the
reward was published. The plaintiff sued in
assumpsit for the reward, and the question
which the court decided was, not whether there
was a contract or not, but whether the precedent condition had been fulfilled, and finding it had been decided for the plaintiff, but
based its decision wholly on the case of
Williams v. Carwardine,11 which has already
been sufficiently discussed.
Another case, which it is claimed follows
these, is Board of County Commissioners v.
Wood, 1 2 which was a suit for bounty money,
and the issue in the case was whether furnishing proof was a condition precedent to bringing action, and the court held it was not, but
by way of dicta used the following expressions: "It might be presumed that in entering service and being accredited to the county
he acted with a view to the bounty offered."
"But we doubt whether the presumption is
necessary," citing 1 Story Con., see. 380a,
where the conditional promise doctrine is
stated, and two eases not in point, 1 3 for in
neither of the cases were these points raised
or referred to, the issue in one being the right
104 Houst. 293.

SSupra.
7 Supra.
8

Supra.

9 4 Barn. & Ado]. 621.

12 39 Ind. 45.

13Wentworth v. Day, 3 Met. 352, and Freeman v;
Boston, 5 Yet. 56.
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to lien and in the other whether the offer
contemplated the future as well as the past,
and for all that appears in both the parties
may have had knowledge of the offers and
intended to accept thorn.
Another case relied upon to support the
doctrine of Williams v. Carwardine,1 4 is
Russell v. Stewart, 5 where the question was
whether a man could recover a reward offered
for the arrest and conviction of a murderer,
though the one claiming the reward did not
know of the offer at the time of the arrest,
and the court answered the question in the
affirmative, without once alluding to the question whether knowledge of the offer is essential, but rather confining its discussion to
whether the claimant was the agent of a man
whose duty it was to make the arrest without
compensation by reward because of his being
especially hired for that purpose, or was acting independently, and finding he acted independently allowed a recovery.
The last case usually cited in support of
this contention is that of Auditor v. Ballard, 16 wherethe action was to recover a reward for the apprehension of a fugitive from
justice, though the claimant did not know of
the offer, and the court held that he could,
saying that it is like the "case of labor done
and performed on request."
And "Why
should the state inquire whether lie knew or
not?" The benefit is the same in either case.
This decision was based on Dawkins v. Sappington, 1 7 which cited alone, Williams v.
Carwardine.'1
Such a holding is to be
expected from the court which decided
Reeder v. Anderson,
discussed above.
The Kentucky holdings on the subject are
certainly extreme, and I can see no way of
explaining or reconciling them. They seem
to me to be utterly without authority, offensive to the fundamental legal principles of
the common law and the cause of utmost confusion so far as they have any influence.
How is there any similarity between a case
where there may be an offer, but it has never
been heard of or relitd on, and a case of
"labor done and performed on request,"
where the essence of the transaction and recovery is the knowledge and the reliance?
14

Supra.

16 44 Vt. 170.

169 Bush. 572.
17 26 Ind. 199.
18Supra.

109

Rules of diction ought to settle this question ;
it does not need to be submitted to a judicial
tribunal.
From the character of the arguments in the
foregoing cases and the nature of the authorities they quote it is easily seen how flimsy is
the whole texture of the decisions giving a
claimant the right to recover a reward, of
which, at the time of performing his services,
he has never heard or which he does not intend to accept. They give no clear and cogent reasons for permitting a recovery, but
rather the allowance of the same is subversive
of all clearness and cogency. The only defensible position is that announced in Williams
v. West Chicago, etc., 1 9 and the other cases
holding a knowledge of the offer and intent
to accept essentials to the recovery of a reward; and it seems to me that the only justifiable course is to maintain that these cases
announce the true doctrine, that there are not
two strong lines of authority, but that the
cases announcing the other doctrine are contra
and out of harmony with the true and leading
holdings.
HuGH EVANDER WILLIS.
University of Minnesota.
19Sup ra.

CRIMINAL LAW-PROPER INSTRUCTIONS AS
TO
CONVICTION ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
STATE v. BLYDENBURGI.
Supreme Court of Iowa, Octobcr 25, 1905.

On a prosecution for murder, the evidence relied
on by the state was circumstantial, and in the first
paragraph of the charge the court instructed that the
burden was upon the state to establish the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and stated that the presumption of innocence continued until the evidence
satisfied the jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
which was defined. Thereafter the jury was told
that, in order to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the facts proved mu:,t nbt only be consistent with guilt, but inconsistent with any rational
theory of innocence, and in another paragraph the
court called the attention of the jury to the specific matters of fact essential to the ultimate
fact of guilt, and the jury were told that each separate fact must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Held that defendant could not complain of the refusal of an instruction that, in order to warrant a
conviction on circumstantial evidence, each fact in
the chain of circumstances must be established by
competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

